MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS, G.R. No. 162368
Petitioner,
Present:
Panganiban, C.J.
(Chairperson),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
BRIX FERRARIS,
Respondent. Promulgated:
July 17, 2006
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YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed
by petitioner Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris of the Resolution dated
On
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed[3] in toto the judgment of the trial
court. It held that the evidence on
record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from psychological
incapacity or that his “defects” were incurable and already present at the
inception of the marriage.[4] The Court of Appeals also found that Dr.
Dayan’s testimony failed to establish the substance of respondent’s
psychological incapacity; that she failed to explain how she arrived at the
conclusion that the respondent has a mixed personality disorder; that she
failed to clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening disabling
factor or an adverse integral element in respondent’s character that
effectively incapacitated him from accepting and complying with the essential
marital obligations.[5]
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied[6]
for lack of merit; thus, she filed a petition for review on certiorari with
this Court. As already stated, the
petition for review was denied for failure of petitioner to show that the
appellate tribunal committed any reversible error.
Petitioner filed the instant motion for
reconsideration.[7] The Court required respondent Brix Ferraris
to file comment[8] but failed
to comply; thus, he is deemed to have waived the opportunity to file
comment. Further, the Court directed the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration which it complied on
After considering the arguments of both the
petitioner and the OSG, the Court resolves to deny petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity
exists in a given case calling for annulment of marriage depends crucially,
more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case.[9] Such factual issue, however, is beyond the
province of this Court to review. It is
not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence
or premises supportive of such factual determination.[10] It is a well-established principle that
factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
binding on this Court,[11]
save for the most compelling and cogent reasons, like when the findings of the
appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the
admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts
which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when
there is a misappreciation of facts,[12] which
are unavailing in the instant case.
The term “psychological incapacity” to be a ground for the nullity
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.[13] As all people may have certain quirks and
idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality
disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of “psychological
incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage.[14] It is for this reason that the Court relies
heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the human
personality. However, the root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
must be fully explained,[15] which
petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.
As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:
Simply
put, the chief and basic consideration in the resolution of marital annulment
cases is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish respondent’s
psychological condition. Here, appellant
contends that there is such evidence. We
do not agree. Indeed, the evidence on
record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from
psychological incapacity. There is
absolutely no showing that his “defects” were already present at the inception
of the marriage, or that those are incurable.
Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioner’s
evidence showed that respondent’s alleged failure to perform his so-called
marital obligations was not at all a manifestation of some deep-seated, grave,
permanent and incurable psychological malady.
To be sure, the couple’s relationship before the marriage and even during
their brief union (for well about a year or so) was not all bad. During that
relatively short period of time, petitioner was happy and contented with her
life in the company of respondent. In
fact, by petitioner’s own reckoning, respondent was a responsible and loving
husband. x x x. Their problems began
when petitioner started doubting respondent’s fidelity. It was only when they started fighting about
the calls from women that respondent began to withdraw into his shell and
corner, and failed to perform his so-called marital obligations. Respondent could not understand petitioner’s
lack of trust in him and her constant naggings.
He thought her suspicions irrational.
Respondent could not relate to her anger, temper and jealousy. x x x.
x x x x
At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at
her diagnosis that respondent has a mixed personality disorder called “schizoid,”
and why he is the “dependent and avoidant type.” In fact, Dr. Dayan’s statement that one
suffering from such mixed personality disorder is dependent on others for
decision x x x lacks specificity; it seems to belong to the realm of
theoretical speculation. Also, Dr.
Dayan’s information that respondent had extramarital affairs was supplied by
the petitioner herself. Notably, when
asked as to the root cause of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity,
Dr. Dayan’s answer was vague, evasive and inconclusive. She replied that such disorder “can be part
of his family upbringing” x x x. She
stated that there was a history of respondent’s parents having difficulties in
their relationship. But this input on
the supposed problematic history of respondent’s parents also came from
petitioner. Nor did Dr. Dayan clearly
demonstrate that there was really “a natal or supervening disabling factor” on
the part of respondent, or an “adverse integral element” in respondent’s
character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting, and, thereby
complying with, the essential marital obligations. Of course, petitioner likewise failed to
prove that respondent’s supposed psychological or mental malady existed even
before the marriage. All these omissions
must be held up against petitioner, for the reason that upon her devolved the
onus of establishing nullity of the marriage.
Indeed, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage and the indissolubility of the marital vinculum.[16]
We find respondent’s alleged mixed personality
disorder, the “leaving-the-house”
attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic
attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his
preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not
rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[17]
where therein respondent preferred to spend more time with his
friends than his family on whom he squandered his money, depended on his
parents for aid and assistance, and was dishonest to his wife regarding his
finances, the Court held that the psychological defects spoken of were more of
a “difficulty,” if not
outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance
of some marital obligations and that a mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological
incapacity; it is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must
be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological, not
physical, illness.
Also, we held in Hernandez v.
Court of Appeals[18]
that habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do
not by themselves constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based on
psychological incapacity.
While petitioner’s marriage with the
respondent failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the remedy however
is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a
null and void marriage.[19] No less than the Constitution recognizes the
sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees marriage as
legally “inviolable” and
protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be “protected” by the state.[20]
Thus, in determining the import of “psychological incapacity”
under Article 36, it must be read in conjunction with, although to be taken as
distinct from Articles 35,[21]
37,[22]
38,[23]
and 41[24]
that would likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage void ab
initio, or Article 45[25]
that would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify
a petition for legal separation. Care must
be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.[26] Article 36 should not to be confused with a
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest
themselves.[27] Neither
it is to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be
rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure,
moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity, abandonment and the like.[28]
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration of the Resolution
dated
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO
J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Resolution
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 96-99. Penned by Judge Franchito N. Diamante.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
Concurring Opinion of Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 335 Phil. 664, 680 (1997).
[10] Abacus
Real Estate Development Center, Inc. v. Manila Banking Corporation, G.R.
No. 162270, April 6, 2005, 455 SCRA 97, 106.
[11] Domingo
v. Robles, G.R. No. 153743,
[12] Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Macalinao, G.R. No. 141856, February 11, 2005,
451 SCRA 63, 69.
[13] Marcos
v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 851 (2000).
[14]
[15] Republic
v. Court of Appeals, supra note 9
at 677.
[16] Rollo,
pp. 111-113.
[17] Supra note 9 at 669 & 674.
[18]
377 Phil. 919, 931 (1999).
[19] Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, G.R. No.
158896,
[20] Republic
v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577,
[21]
Art. 35. The following marriages shall
be void from the beginning:
(1) Those
contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of
parents or guardians;
(2) Those
solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless
such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good
faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so;
(3) Those solemnized without a license,
except those covered by the preceding Chapter;
(4) Those
bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;
(5) Those
contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the
other; and
(6) Those
subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
[22] Art.
37. Marriages between the following are
incestuous and void from the beginning, whether the relationship between the
parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) Between
ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2) Between
brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
[23] Art.
38. The following marriages shall be
void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:
(1) Between
collateral blood relatives, whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the
fourth civil degree;
(2) Between
step-parents and step-children;
(3) Between
parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between
the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between
the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(6) Between
the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
(7) Between
an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
(8) Between
the adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between
parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other
person’s spouse or his or her own spouse.
[24] Art.
41. A marriage contracted by any person
during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was already dead.
In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent
marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse.
[25]
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for
any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(1) That
the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was
eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was
solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having
substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after
attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and
both lived together as husband and wife;
(2) That
either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason,
freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(3) That
the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party
afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(4) That
the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue
influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter
freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(5) That
either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the
other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
(6) That
either party was inflicted with a sexually-transmitted disease found to be
serious and appears to be incurable.
[26]
Concurring Opinion of Justice Jose C. Vitug in Republic v. Court of Appeals,
supra note 9 at 690.
[27] Carating-Siayngco
v. Siayngco, supra note 19 at
439.
[28] Marcos v. Marcos, supra note 13.